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ABSTRACT
Talented students compete fiercely for seats at Boston and New York exam schools. These schools
are characterized by high levels of peer achievement and a demanding curriculum tailored to each
district's highest achievers. While exam school students do very well in school, the question of whether
an exam school education adds value relative to a regular public education remains open. We estimate
the causal effect of exam school attendance using a regression-discontinuity design, reporting both
parametric and non- parametric estimates. The outcomes studied here include scores on state standardized
achievement tests, PSAT and SAT participation and scores, and AP scores. Our estimates show little
effect of exam school offers on most students' achievement. We use two-stage least squares to convert
reduced form estimates of the effects of exam school offers into estimates of peer and tracking effects,
arguing that these appear to be unimportant in this context. Finally, we explore the external validity
of RD estimates, arguing that as best we can tell, there is little effect of an exam school education on
achievement even for the highest-ability marginal applicants and for applicants to the right of admissions
cutoffs. On the other hand, a Boston exam school education seems to have a modest effect on high
school English scores for minority applicants. A small group of 9th grade applicants also appears to
do better on SAT Reasoning. These localized gains notwithstanding, the intense competition for exam




















The Boston and New York City public school systems include a handful of highly selective
exam schools. Unlike most other American public schools, exam schools screen applicants on
the basis of a competitive admissions test. Boston's exam school 
agship, the Boston Latin
School, is the oldest high school in the country; New York's venerable Bronx High School of
Science and Stuyvesant High School also have storied histories. Just as many American high
school seniors work and compete to gain admission to the country's most selective colleges and
universities, younger students and parents in a few cities aspire to win coveted seats at top
exam schools.1
Fewer than half of Boston applicants win a seat to one of three exam schools, and less than
a sixth of exam school applicants are oered a seat at the three original exam schools in New
York. Because exam school oers are test-based, exam school students have signicantly higher
test scores than do typical public school students. The pre-application math and English scores
of students oered a seat at one of the least competitive Boston and New York exam schools
are on the order of 0.5-0.7 standard deviations (hereafter, ) higher than the scores of those
who apply but not oered.2 Dierences in baseline performance between applicants at the most
competitive exam school and those in regular public schools are even more impressive, at over
1.5 for Boston 7th graders and over 1.25 for New York 9th graders.
At rst blush, the intense competition for an exam school education is understandable. By
any measure, exam school students are well ahead of virtually all other public school students.
It is easy to see why many parents dream of placing their children in such a school. At the
same time, it's also clear that at least some of the achievement advantage associated with exam
school attendance re
ects the schools' admissions policies and is not caused by attendance per
se. After all, exam school students are a highly select group, a fact that must in
uence naive
comparisons between exam school students and anyone else.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the causal eects of exam school attendance on
applicant achievement as measured by standardized tests. We use a regression discontinuity
(RD) research design that, if successful, eliminates the selection bias that contaminates naive
comparisons. Our strategy in a nutshell is to compare the scores of exam school applicants
who barely clear the admissions cuto to the scores of those who fall just below. Those who
1Boston and New York exam schools claim a long list of distinguished alumni, including 11 Nobel laureates,
ve signers of the Declaration of Independence, and a few dozen distinguished economists, including Robert
Fogel, Jerry Green, Jesse Shapiro (Stuyvesant); Claudia Goldin (Bronx Science); and Gary Chamberlain and
Charles Manski (Boston Latin School). Other American cities with similarly selective public high schools include
Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington.
2Pre-application scores come from 4th grade for 7th grade applicants, and from 8th grade math and 7th
grade English for 9th grade applicants. We refer to these pre-application scores as baseline scores.
1clear the cuto are more likely to attend an exam school (and attend for longer) than those
who fall below the cuto, though some in the latter group also eventually succeed in gaining
admission. A dummy for clearing the admissions cuto is therefore an instrument for exam
school attendance in a fuzzy RD setup.
Before turning to the details of the empirical analysis, it's worth asking what exam school
attendance means for an admitted student. First, exam school students study with peers who
have similarly high levels of ability. If peer eects are important, this alone should boost
achievement. Second, the exam school curriculum is meant to challenge the highly able exam
school population. Finally, some exam schools have resources and facilities typically unavailable
at other public schools, such as modern science labs and well-equipped athletic facilities. The
resource advantage is not entirely clear, however, since many exam schools operate with class
sizes substantially larger than are typical of the schools in their host district. It's also common
for exam schools to have an older, perhaps more experienced teaching sta, though exam school
teaching assignments are usually considered a perquisite associated with seniority alone and not
necessarily teaching quality (Stern, 2003). The exam school estimates reported here, therefore,
seem most likely to be informative about a combination of peer and tracking eects on high-
achieving public school students. This observation motivates us to construct instruments for
the length of time exposed to an exam school curriculum and average levels of peer achievement,
two potentially endogenous mediating variables for which there is a strong exam-school-oer
rst stage.
Our results oer little evidence of an achievement gain for those admitted to an exam
school; most of the estimates can be interpreted as reasonably precise zeros, with a smattering
of signicant eects, both positive and negative. In other words, in spite of their exposure to
much higher-achieving peers and a more challenging curriculum, marginal students admitted
to exam schools generally do no better on a variety of standardized tests. For the most part,
this nding carries over to subgroups of minorities and women, though we nd some evidence
of an exam school achievement boost on high school English tests for minority applicants in
Boston. Results for minorities are of special interest given the history of litigation around
minority admissions. Our analysis of College Board outcomes also uncovers a small subset of
admitted applicants who appear to earn higher SAT scores than they otherwise would have.
One explanation for the absence of broad exam school achievement gains is the local nature
of RD: marginal applicants may be ill-positioned to benet from an exam school education.
At the same time, estimation for these applicants are of considerable scientic and policy
interest. For one thing, applicants close to admissions cutos are still relatively high achievers,
with measured ability far above that of most other urban public school students. Although
education research often focuses on interventions meant to serve students in the lower tail of
2the ability distribution, the education production function for high achievers should also be of
interest. Moreover, on the policy side, most commonly proposed innovations aecting exam
school access, such as new campuses, earlier admissions grades, and strengthened minority or
socioeconomic preferences, are likely to aect students near current admissions cutos. It's also
worth noting that our applicant sample spans a wide range of ability. For example, in 2009,
Boston Latin students had SAT scores ranked among the top ve schools in the state (634 in
math and 616 in Reading). At the other end, O'Bryant students have average SAT scores below
the state mean (972 on the Reasoning test at O'Bryant vs. 1031 statewide), though still well
above the Boston Public Schools (BPS) average (894 on the Reasoning test).
Although the local nature of RD estimates does not diminish our interest in them, the
external validity of these estimates is still of considerable interest. A nal contribution of our
work is a systematic exploration of external validity. First, we exploit the fact that many of
the applicants who are marginal on the exam school admissions test have exceptionally high
scores on other tests. RD estimates for students who are in the upper half and upper quartile of
the baseline test score distribution (a test that precedes the entrance examination) are broadly
in line with the estimates for the entire population near admission cutos. We also report
estimates from two econometric modeling strategies intended to extrapolate causal eects for
applicants who are away from admissions cutos; both approaches fail to uncover any evidence
that the results for marginal applicants are unusual.
The next section describes Boston and New York exam schools in more detail and brie
y
reviews related literature. Section 3 discusses Boston data and descriptive statistics, while
Section 4 lays out our discontinuity-based estimation framework. Section 5 presents the main
analysis for Boston. We begin with Boston because Massachusetts state achievement scores -
centrally and anonymously graded math and English tests for multiple grades - appear to be
more reliable than New York's Regents exams, which have a locally graded component and
re
ect the subject mix chosen by examinees. We also use the Boston data to look at eects
on PSAT, SAT, and Advanced Placement exams. The Boston results include 2SLS estimates
of peer and time-in-school eects and estimates for various subgroups Section 6 summarizes a
parallel set of results for the eect of New York City's exam schools on Regents exams. The
paper concludes in Section 7.
2 Boston and New York Exam Schools
Boston has three exam schools, each spanning grades 7-12. The best-known is the Boston
Latin School, which enrolls about 2,400 students. Often described as the crown jewel of Boston's
public school system, Boston Latin School was named a top 20 U.S. high school in the inaugural
32007 U.S. News & World Report school rankings. Founded in 1635, the Boston Latin School is
America's rst public school and the oldest still open (Goldin and Katz, 2008).3 The Boston
Latin School is a model for other exam schools. Imitators include the Brooklyn Latin School,
recently opened in New York (Jan, 2006). The second oldest Boston exam school is Boston
Latin Academy, formerly the Girls' Latin School. Opened in 1877, Latin Academy rst admitted
boys in 1972 and currently enrolls about 1,700 students. The John D. O'Bryant High School
of Mathematics and Science (formerly Boston Technical High) is Boston's third exam school;
O'Bryant opened in 1893 and currently enrolls about 1,200 students.
New York's three original academic exam schools are Stuyvesant High School, Bronx High
School of Science, and Brooklyn Technical High School, each spanning grades 9-12. The New
York exam schools were established in the rst half of the 20th century and share a number of
features with Boston's exam schools. For example, Stuyvesant and Bronx Science are members
of the Newsweek list of elite public high schools and all three have appeared in the U.S. News
& World Report rankings. Stuyvesant enrolls just over 3,000 students, Bronx Science enrolls
2,600-2,800 students, and Brooklyn Technical has about 4,500 students. In 2002, three new
exam schools opened in New York: the High School for Math, Science and Engineering at City
College, the High School of American Studies at Lehman College, and Queens High School
for the Sciences at York College. In 2005, Staten Island Technical High School converted to
exam status, while the Brooklyn Latin School opened in 2006. The admissions process for
these new schools is the same as for the three original exam schools, but we omit them from
our study because they are not as well established as the traditional exam schools, and some
have unusual characteristics (e.g., small enrollment). Finally, we've structured the New York
analysis to parallel that for Boston.4
A dening feature of an exam school education is exposure to high-achieving peers. The
dierence between the average pre-application achievement of students enrolled at the Boston
Latin School and those enrolled at a traditional Boston school, reported in Table 1, is over two
standard deviations for math and about 1:75 for English. Although the other two Boston
exam schools are not as selective as Boston Latin, peer achievement gaps at O'Bryant and
Latin Academy are still substantial (more than 1:0 for math and English at O'Bryant, and
over 1:25 at Latin Academy). Students at the three New York City exam schools also have
much higher pre-application scores than students at traditional public high schools. Students
enrolled at Brooklyn Technical are roughly 1:5 ahead of the New York average in both math
3Boston Latin School was established one year before Harvard College. Local lore has it that Harvard was
founded to give graduates of Latin a place to continue their studies.
4Estimates including New York's new exam schools are similar to those generated by the three-school sample.
Other selective New York public schools include the Fiorello H. LaGuardia High School, which focuses on visual
and performing arts and admits students by audition, and Hunter College High School, which uses a unique
admissions procedure and is not operated by the New York Department of Education.
4and English, while the Stuyvesant score advantage is more than two standard deviations (shown
in Table 9).
The challenging nature of an exam school curriculum can be gauged by the number of ad-
vanced placement (AP) courses. Katnani (2010) reports that Stuyvesant oers thirty-seven AP
courses, while Boston Latin School oers 23. Stuyvesant boasts the the highest number of AP
test-takers in the country, as well as the most scoring at least 3 or higher on AP tests, typically
the minimum required for college credit (Saulny, 2005). In addition to AP courses, exam schools
oer other advanced courses and academic experiences. At Bronx Science, for example, stu-
dents have the opportunity to do research with local scientists. Bronx Science and Stuyvesant
send many nalists to the Intel (formerly, Westinghouse) Science Talent Search. Many exam
school students compete in the American Mathematics Contest and similar achievement-driven
face-os.
Along with their rich menu of course oerings, exam schools typically impose high grad-
uation standards. Boston Latin students take four years of Latin and give declamations in
grades 7-10. O'Bryant students enroll in six years of math. The New York exam schools oer
advanced diplomas based on academic and extra-curricular work beyond that required for New
York State Regents diploma.
Some exam schools have endowments and raise money for special projects. These extra
resources are used for college scholarships, faculty training, and facilities. Each year, the
Boston Latin School Association contributes about $700,000 to the school's annual budget from
an endowment of about $15 million. The Brooklyn Technical Alumni Foundation completed
a fundraising campaign of $10 million for the school in 2005. These funds went to a robotics
laboratory, library improvements, and a gym, among other things (Steinberg, 1998a). The
alumni associations of Stuyvesant and Bronx Science made similar large pledges (Steinberg,
1998b). Katnani (2010) reports that the Harry V. Keefe Library-Media Center at the Boston
Latin School, named after a three-million-dollar alumni donor, is \the most advanced school
library in the world."
Course oerings and facility upgrades notwithstanding, exam schools look somewhat worse
than traditional public schools in comparisons of class size. The average student-to-teacher
ratio at the Boston Latin School is 22, compared to a district-wide average of 12 for middle
schools and 15 for high schools, a comparison also documented in Table 1. In New York, the
exam student-to-teacher ratio is roughly 31, compared to about 27 district-wide.5
Like other public school teachers in New York and Boston, exam school teachers are members
of the local bargaining unit, and exam school stang decisions are proscribed by the union
contract in force. Teaching and administrative assignments at New York's exam schools attract
5These numbers are computed using data from the 2007-08 New York State School Report Cards.
5scrutiny because exam school jobs are considered highly desirable (see, e.g., Stern (2003) and
Kugel (2005)). In practice, the exam school teaching sta is more senior and more likely to
be dened as highly qualied according to state certication standards. At New York's exam
schools, 44% of teachers are age 48 or older, compared to about 30% at other non-exam schools.6
Likewise, the Boston exam school teaching sta is substantially more senior than that at other
BPS schools.
The proportion of minority applicants admitted to exam schools has often been a lightning
rod for controversy. Under Boston's court-mandated 1970s desegregation plan, Federal Judge
Arthur Garrity ordered that \at least 35% of each of the entering classes at Boston Latin School,
Boston Latin Academy and Boston Technical High in September 1975 shall be composed of
black and Hispanic students." This policy maintained the proportion of black and Hispanic
students at roughly 35% for many years. Racial preferences in Boston exam school admissions
were rst challenged in 1996. Following a series of court proceedings, Boston exam school
admissions have been purely exam and GPA-based since 1999 (Boston Public Schools, 2007).7
In the 1960s, civil rights groups argued that New York's exam school admissions test is
biased against black and Puerto Rican applicants. These challenges ultimately led to the 1972
Hecht-Calandra Act, a state law guaranteeing that exam school admissions be based solely
on a competitive exam. To boost minority enrollment, the New York public school district
runs the Specialized High School Institute (SHSI), a ve-week summer training program for
economically disadvantaged students enrolled in grades 6-8.
Related Work
As far as we know, ours is one of two RD analyses of achievement eects at highly selective
U.S. exam schools. In independent work, Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) examine the impact of New
York City's exam schools on longer term academic outcomes; their analysis shows no impact on
college enrollment and quality. Selective high schools have also been studied elsewhere. Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola (2010) estimate the eects of attending selective high schools in Romania,
where the admissions process is similar to that used by Boston's exam schools. Selective
Romanian high schools appear to boost scores on the high-stakes Romanian Baccalaureate
test. Jackson (2010) similarly reports large score gains for those attending a selective school
in Trinidad and Tobago. On the other hand, despite the huge peer advantage enjoyed by
selective school students in the UK, Clarke (2008) uses RD to show that these schools generate
modest score gains at most. Likewise, using admissions lotteries to analyze the consequences
6These averages are weighted by number of teachers per school as of October 2008, tabulated from the le
used by Rocko and Herrmann (2010).
7Although preferences ocially ended in 1999, the race of 7th grade applicants does not appear to in
uence
school assignment by 1997, the year after the 1996 challenge.
6of selective middle school attendance in China, Zhang (2010) nds no achievement gains for
students randomly oered seats at a selective school.
A number of American studies overlap with ours as well. The closest is probably Bui,
Craig, and Imberman (2011), who report RD estimates of the the impact of gifted and talented
(GT) services on student outcomes in regular public schools in a large urban district, as well
as lottery-based estimates of the eects of attendance at a GT magnet school in this district.
They nd little GT impact. Likewise, Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) use admissions lotteries
to show that randomly assigned opportunities to transfer to higher-scoring high schools in
Chicago do not appear to boost scores. Chicago magnet schools are not exam schools, though
Chicago now has nine of these. In a related paper, Cullen and Jacob (2008) estimate the
eects of attendance at Chicago GT programs in public elementary schools and similarly nd
no achievement eects.
Elite education is perhaps more pervasive in American higher education than at the sec-
ondary level. Dale and Krueger (2002) compare students who applied to and were rejected by
comparable sets of colleges. Perhaps surprisingly, this comparison shows no earnings advantage
for those who went to more selective schools, with the possible exceptions of minority and rst-
generation college applicants in more recent data (Dale and Krueger, 2011). In contrast with
the Dale and Krueger results, Hoekstra (2009) reports that graduates of a state university's
(relatively selective) 
agship campus earn more later on than those who went elsewhere.
Finally, a large literature looks at peer eects in educational settings. Examples include
Angrist and Lang (2004), Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), and Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt (2009).
Findings in the education peer eects literature are mixed and not easily summarized. It seems
fair to say, however, that the potential for omitted variables bias in naive estimates motivates
much of the econometric agenda in this context. Economists have also studied tracking. A
recent randomized evaluation from Kenya looks at tracking as well as peer eects, nding gains
from the former but little evidence of the latter (Du
o, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011).
3 Boston Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtained registration and demographic information for Boston Public School (BPS) students
from 1997-2009. BPS registration data is used to determine whether and for how many years a
student was enrolled at a Boston exam school. Demographic information in the BPS le includes
race, sex, subsidized lunch status, limited English prociency status, and special education
status.
BPS demographic and registration information were merged with Massachusetts Compre-
hensive Assessment System (MCAS) scores using the BPS student ID. MCAS test are adminis-
7tered each spring, typically in grades 3-8 and 10. The MCAS database contains raw scores for
math, English Language Arts (ELA), Writing, and Science. The current testing regime covers
math and English in grade 7, 8, and 10 (in earlier years, there were fewer tests). Baseline
(i.e., pre-application) scores for grade 7 applicants are from 4th grade MCAS exams. Baseline
English scores for 9th grade applicants come from 8th grade math and 7th grade English (the
8th grade English exam was introduced in 2006). We lose some applicants with missing baseline
scores. For the purposes of our analysis, scores were standardized by subject, grade, and year
to have mean zero and unit variance in the BPS student population.
Our analysis le combines the student registration and MCAS les with the BPS exam school
applicant le. This le contains applicants' BPS ID, grade, year, sending school, ranking of
exam schools, Independent Schools Entrance Exam (ISEE) test schools, and each exam school's
ranking of applicants.
The study sample includes BPS-enrolled students who applied for exam school seats in 7th
grade from 1997-2008 or in 9th grade from 2001-2007. We focus on applicants enrolled in BPS
at the time of application because we're interested in how an exam school education compares to
a traditional BPS education. Private school applicants are much more likely to remain outside
the BPS district and hence out of our sample if they fail to get an exam school oer (about
45% of Boston exam school applicants come from private schools). The 10% of applicants who
apply to transfer from one exam school to another are also omitted. The data appendix gives
a detailed explanation of our analysis le, along with more information on test and application
timing.
3.1 Student Characteristics
Non-exam BPS students are mostly minority and poor enough to qualify for a subsidized lunch.
Black and Hispanic students are somewhat under-represented among exam school applicants
and students, but most exam school applicants are also poor. These statistics are reported in
Table 2, which compares the demographic characteristics and baseline test scores of non-exam
school BPS students with those of the exam school applicant sample.8
Not surprisingly, there are few special education students in an exam school, though many
exam school applicants and students are classied as limited English procient. Exam school
applicants are clearly a self-selected group, with markedly higher baseline scores than other
BPS students. For example, grade 7 applicants' 4th grade math scores are almost 0.8 higher
than those of a typical BPS student. Oered students are even more positively selected, with
a score gap of 1.4 in math and 1.3 in English. Similarly large gaps emerge for 9th graders.
8The sample here includes 6th and 8th graders who were enrolled in BPS and applying for admission in 7th
and 9th grade. Data for grade 7 cover 1997-2008; data for grade 9 cover 2001-2007.
8Finally, note that there are many more exam school seats in grade 7 than grade 9. As a
result, the probability an applicant is oered a seat is much lower for 9th grade applicants.
3.2 Descriptive Estimates
To set the stage for the RD estimates, we begin with a descriptive regression analysis of the
relation between the standardized MCAS scores of student i tested in year t, denoted by yit,
and measures of exam school exposure. Specically, we report ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of equations like





0Xi + Mit + 
0Ii + it; (1)
t to the sample of exam school applicants. Here, t is a test year eect, j is a control for the
student application cohort (interaction of year and grade), and Xi is a vector of demographic
variables that includes gender, race, and free lunch status. (Students with missing demographics
are omitted.) The exam school mediator, Mit, is captured either by a dummy for exam school
enrollment following the application year; by the number of years a student was enrolled in
an exam school from application date to test date; or, motivated by the fact that exam school
enrollment is associated with exposure to high-achieving peers, by the average baseline score
of peers in the year after application. Some specications also include Ii, a vector of four ISEE
scores from verbal, quantitative, reading, and math subtests. The estimates were computed in
samples pooling 7th and 9th grade applicants and all available MCAS test outcomes for each
applicant.9
Models without ISEE controls generate large positive coecients for each measure of exam
school exposure. For example, the enrollment estimate for math reported in column (1) of Table
3 is nearly 1:0, while that reported in column (7) for ELA is 0:8. The corresponding per-year
estimates are 0:36 and 0:31. Models for peer means generate estimates of about 0:6 for
both math and ELA. Not surprisingly given the nature of exam-school selection, the inclusion
of ISEE score controls in equation (1) reduces the estimated exam school exposure coecients
considerably. Estimates for enrollment and exam years with ISEE controls fall to about a third
of the size of estimates without ISEE controls. The decline in peer mean coecients with ISEE
controls is even larger, though even when estimated with controls, the estimated peer eects
are still substantial and statistically signicant at 0:1   0:15.
The sensitivity of exam school mediator coecients to the inclusion of ISEE controls high-
lights the fact that a good part of the apparent exam school advantage re
ects positive selection
9The standard errors here and elsewhere are clustered by enrollment school and test year (and by student
when there are multiple test outcomes per student).
9bias. On the other hand, even conditional on ISEE controls, exam school exposure is highly
positively correlated with student achievement. In the next section, we turn to a RD framework
to determine whether this correlation is causal.
4 Boston RD Framework
4.1 The Boston Admissions Process
Boston residents interested in an exam school seat take the ISEE in the fall of the school year
before they would like to transfer. 7th grade applicants are typically transferring out of their
current middle school, while 9th grade applicants are picking a new high school and typically
participate in the regular high school matching process, as well as the exam school process.
Exam school applicants also submit an authorized GPA report that winter, based on grades
through the most recent fall term. Finally, exam school applicants are required to rank up to
three exam schools on the application form. The exam school composite score is a weighted
average of applicants' math and English GPA, along with scores on the four parts of the ISEE
(verbal, quantitative, reading, and math).
For the purposes of the analysis here, composite scores were standardized separately for
each school using the sample of applicants to that school, generating ranking variable Rik for
student i, specic to school k. A smaller value of Rik indicates that the student has a higher
composite score and is more likely to gain admission. We focus on those applying for seats in
the 7th and 9th grades (O'Bryant also accepts a handful of 10th graders).
Applicants are ranked only for schools to which they've applied, so applicants with the same
GPA and ISEE scores might be ranked somewhat dierently at dierent schools depending on
where they fall in each school's applicant pool. Exam school assignment is then based on
the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (see, e.g., Pathak (2011) for a formal
description) which generates a cuto, Ck, the largest rank to obtain an oer for each school.
For the purposes of our gures and empirical work, we scaled school-specic composite ranks
according to:




where Ik are students who ranked school k. Scaled school-specic ranks provide a running
variable that equals zero at the cuto for school k, with positive values indicating students who
applied to and qualied for admission at that school.
104.2 Discontinuities in oers, enrollment, and peers
The exam school admissions process generates large discontinuities in the relation between rik
and the probability of an exam school oer, with somewhat more modest though still substantial
jumps in enrollment. This can be seen in Figures 1-3 for 7th grade applicants. Panels in the
gures cover a scaled rank interval of [-20,+20] for each of the three Boston exam schools.
Applicants outside the 20-unit band are either far below or well beyond the relevant cutos.
Plotted points are conditional means for all applicants in a one-unit binwidth similar to the
empirical conditional mean functions reported in Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004).
The gures also show smoothed conditional mean functions allowing for jumps at each
cuto. Specically, for school k, data in the Boston window were used to construct local linear
regression (LLR) estimates of ^ E[yijrik], where yi is the dependent variable and rik is the running
variable. The LLR smoother uses the edge kernel:
K(uik) = 1juikj1(1   juikj);
where uik =
rik
h and h is the bandwidth. In a RD context, LLR has been shown to produce
estimates with good properties at boundary points (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001)
and Porter (2003)). The bandwidth used here is a version of that proposed by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2010) (hereafter, IK) who derive optimal bandwidths for sharp RD using a
mean square-error loss function with a regularization adjustment. The jump in the conditional
mean function at the cuto is the IK sharp RD estimate of the eect of an oer at a particular
school.10
Figure 1 captures key elements of the relation between running variables and school-specic
enrollment rates. In each panel, the dark line plots the oer rate at the school for which the
panel is labeled, while the dotted line is the probability of an oer at other exam schools. For
example, the leftmost panel in Figure 1 shows that students who score just above the O'Bryant
cuto obtain an oer at the O'Bryant school with near certainty. But O'Bryant applicants who
ranked another exam school ahead of O'Bryant may be oered a seat at this school instead.
Hence, the O'Bryant panel also shows an increasing probability of admission to other exam
schools as we move right from the O'Bryant cuto. The center panel, for Latin Academy,
shows very high probabilities of receiving an exam school oer (in this case, from O'Bryant)
for those to the left of, but close to, the Latin Academy cuto. Finally, almost everyone to the
left of the Latin School cuto gets an oer from another exam school, while to the right of the
Latin School cuto, oer rates at Latin School jump from 0 to about 0.75.
10As with the estimates discussed below, the sample used for to estimate smoothed lines in the plots in-
cludes only applicants within 10 units of each school-specic cuto, though the plot window is wider. IK
implementation is discussed in detail in the next section.
11Figure 2 plots the relation between scaled ranks and exam school enrollment instead of oers.
Applicants scoring just above admissions cutos are much more likely to enroll in a given school
than are those just below the cutos. On the other hand, enrollment rates at other schools
also change around each school-specic cuto. Figure 3 puts these pieces together by plotting
jumps in the probability of enrollment in any exam school around each school-specic cuto
(this is the sum of the dark and dotted lines in Figure 2). Exam school enrollment jumps at
the O'Bryant and Latin Academy cutos, but changes little at the Latin School cuto because
those to the left are very likely to enroll in either O'Bryant or Latin Academy.
Much like the relation for enrollment, Figure 4 shows that students with normalized
composite-score ranks that clear school-specic cutos spend more time enrolled in exam
schools. Although some applicants to the left of the O'Bryant cuto eventually accumulate
enrollment years by applying again in grade 9, those to the right of the O'Bryant cuto spend
about two years more in exam schools than those to the left. The discontinuity in exam school
years is less pronounced at the Latin Academy cuto, and there is no jump in years at the
Latin School cuto. This re
ects the fact that students who come close to, but fail to clear, the
Latin Academy and Latin School cutos, almost certainly get oers at the next school down
in the Boston exam school hierarchy.11
An important component of the exam school experience is exposure to other high-achieving
students. Figures 5 and 6 document this by plotting the average baseline score of peers for
applicants on either side of admissions cutos.12 Baseline peer means jump by about half a
standard deviation at each admissions cuto. This implies that (conditional on applying to
an exam school) peers at Latin Academy are ahead of non-exam BPS peers by a full standard
deviation, while peers at Latin School are ahead of non-exam BPS peers by about 1.5. It's
also worth nothing that the lower deciles of the baseline peer score distribution jump by a
roughly similar amount. This implies that even if marginal admits are tracked within schools
(so that they study primarily with the lower tail of the exam school enrolled population), the
peer quality to which they are exposed nevertheless jumps at the cuto.
Although not shown here, oer and enrollment patterns for grade 9 applicants are similar
to those shown here for grade 7 applicants. The grade 9 sample is much smaller, however,
especially for Boston Latin Academy and Boston Latin School, which together account for only
a quarter of 9th grade seats. Enrollment and peer discontinuities in the O'Bryant 9th grade
sample look much like those for O'Bryant's 7th graders.
11Note that the total years variable plotted in this gure re
ects the maximum exam school exposure available
to the applicant cohorts in our data. For instance, 7th grade applicants who applied in 2006 will have spent at
most two years in an exam school by the time we see them tested at the end of 8th grade, while our sampling
window closes before we get a chance to see them tested in 10th.
12The peer mean score is the average baseline score of same-grade peers in the school in which an applicant
enrolled in the year following the year of exam-school application.
125 Boston RD Estimates
5.1 Econometric Framework and Reduced Form Estimates
We constructed parametric and non-parametric RD estimates of the eect of an exam school
oer using the normalized composite score as the running variable. We refer to this initial set
of estimates as \reduced form" because they capture the eect of an exam school oer, without
adjustment for the relationship between oers and enrollment or other mediating variables. The
Boston empirical work is limited to sets of applicants with school-specic running variables in
the interval [-10,+10]. Applicants outside this \Boston window" are well below or well above
the relevant cutos. At the same time, the [-10,+10] window is wide enough to allow for
reasonably precise inference using Boston applicant data.
The parametric estimating equation for applicants to school k is
yitk = tk +
X
j
jkdij + (1   Dik)f0k(rik) + Dikf1k(rik) + kDik + itk; (2)
where the variable Dik is an indicator for rik  0 and the coecient of interest is k. Equation
(2) controls for test year eects at school k, denoted tk, and for the year and grade of appli-
cation, indicated by dummies, dij. Eects of the running variable at school k are controlled by
a pair of third-order polynomials that dier on either side of the cuto, specically
fjk(rik) = jkrik + jkr
2
ik +  jkr
3
ik; j = 0;1: (3)
The reduced form estimates generated by this set-up re
ect the fact that applicants to
school k typically apply to more than one school and are likely to have (or to lose) other
exam school options as distance from a given cuto grows. For example, highly qualied
Latin Academy applicants also qualify for admission to Latin School. Looking in the other
direction, while many applicants to Latin Academy also qualify for admission to O'Bryant,
poorly qualied applicants to Latin Academy do not. In small neighborhoods around each
cuto, confounding from other oers disappears, but in the empirical Boston window nearby
cutos determine counterfactual outcomes and are a potential source of nonlinearity in the
relation between running variables and outcomes. In principle, the IK procedure adjusts for
the additional nonlinearity by shortening the bandwidth. The possibility that the resulting
bandwidth straddles multiple cutos, however, raises the question of how we should interpret
the resulting estimates.
Figure 7 presents a stylized representation of the Boston admissions process that sheds some
light on the nature of the causal eects captured by equation (2). The bottom of the gure
13sketches own-school and other-school oers for Latin Academy applicants. At the cuto, Latin
Academy oers naturally jump, but as we move to the right, Latin School oers are made, while
moving to the left, O'Bryant oers fall away. The changing pattern of oers is re
ected in the
reduced form relation between achievement and the Latin Academy running variable. Near
the Latin Academy cuto, reduced form estimates capture the eects of a Latin Academy oer
(only) on students who would also qualify for O'Bryant. In practice, however, even the non-
parametric estimation strategy borrows information that that is close to and sometimes beyond
the next cuto up or down. Therefore, the reduced form eect of Latin Academy oers captures
an average causal eect generated by the dierence in outcomes between applicants who qualify
for admission to Latin Academy, some of whom also qualify at Latin School, and applicants who
don't qualify for Latin Academy, most, but not all of whom qualied for O'Bryant. Although
not sketched in the gure, it should be clear that the same sort of mixing occurs to the left of
the Latin School cuto and to the right of the O'Bryant cuto.
Following the discussion of reduced form estimates, we use 2SLS to simplify the interpreta-
tion of reduced form estimates by assigning reduced form eects to specic channels, such as
peer means, that are manipulated at all cutos in some measure.
Non-parametric RD
Non-parametric estimates dier from parametric in three ways. First, they narrow the Boston
window when the optimal data-driven IK bandwidth falls below 10.13 Second, the non-
parametric estimates use a tent-shaped edge kernel centered at admissions cutos instead of
the uniform kernel implicit in parametric estimation. Finally, non-parametric models control
for linear functions of the running variable only. We can write the non-parametric estimating
equation as




0k(1   Dik)rik + 








kDikrik + kDik + itk (4)
for each of the three schools indexed by k. Non-parametric RD estimates come from a kernel-
weighted least square t of equation (4).
Figures 8-11 show non-parametric RD reduced forms for middle school (7th and 8th grade)
and high school (10th grade) math and English. Dots in the plots are averages in a one-unit
binwidth, while lines are from the local linear smoother using IK bandwidth as before. Jumps
in smoothed scores at admissions cutos are the IK sharp regression discontinuity estimates of
13The IK bandwidths for Table 4 range from about 8 to 24.
14the eects of qualifying for an exam school oer on test scores. Except perhaps for 10th grade
English, the plots oer little evidence of marked discontinuities in MCAS scores at any of the
three admissions cutos.
Not surprisingly, the single-school reduced form estimates, reported in Table 4, tell the same
story as the gures. Few of these estimates are signicantly dierent from zero and some of
the signicant eects at Latin School are negative (for example, Latin School eects on 10th
grade math and middle school English). Most of the estimates are small and some are precise
enough to support a conclusion of no eect.
Stacking Schools
In an eort to increase precision, we also constructed estimates pooling applicants to all three of
Boston's exam schools. The pooled estimating equations are essentially the same as equations
(2) and (4), but with a single oer eect, . Because the pooled model is saturated with a full
set of main eects and interactions for school-specic subsamples, we can think of the estimate
of  in this stack as a variance-of-treatment-weighted average of school-specic estimates.14
Note that some students apply to more than one school and a given student may contribute
up to three observations, even for a single outcome. Our inference framework takes account of
this by clustering by student.15
Paralleling the pattern shown in the Boston reduced form gures, the estimated reduced-
form oer eects from the stacked models, reported in columns labeled \All Schools" in Table
4, are mostly small, with few signicantly dierent from zero. One substantial and signicant
positive eect, for 10th grade English scores, seems to stand out as it appears at individual
schools, and in both parametric and non-parametric estimates. On the other hand, this positive
nding is partly oset by a marginally signicant negative eect on 7th and 8th grade English,
so that when all scores are stacked and pooled the overall estimated impact is close to zero
(scores are stacked in much the same way that schools are stacked). Two other marginally
signicant IK estimates for math are also negative, as is the estimate for 7th grade ELA.
Importantly, the combination of school- and score-pooling generates precise estimates, with
standard errors on the order of 0.028 for both math and ELA.
Appendix A reports results from an exploration of possible threats to a causal interpreta-
tion of the reduced form estimates in Table 4. Specically we look for dierential attrition (i.e.,
missing score data) to the right and left of exam school cutos and for discontinuities in co-
14Variance-weighting is a property of models with saturated regression controls; see, e.g., Angrist (1998). Not
quite literally in this case, however, since the model here is not fully non-parametric.
15An alternative stacking scheme partitions applicants according to the school they are most likely to get
into. For most applicants, however, this is the O'Bryant school. As a result, the resulting stacked estimates
look much like the O'Bryant estimates.
15variates. There is some evidence that receipt of an exam school oer makes attrition somewhat
less likely, but the gaps are small and unlikely to impart substantial selection bias in estimates
that ignore them. A few covariate contrasts also pop up as signicantly dierent from zero, but
the spotty nature of these gaps, and the fact that the parametric and non-parametric ndings
are similar, support the notion that our controlled comparisons to the left and right of exam
school admissions cutos are indeed a good experiment.
A related threat to validity comes from the possibility that marginal students switch out
of exam schools at an unusually high rate. If school switching is harmful, excess switching
might account for ndings showing little in the way of score gains. As it turns out, however,
exam school applicants who clear admissions cutos are more likely to stay at an assigned
school through grade 12 than are traditional BPS students. This partly re
ects the high rate
of student turnover in Boston high schools { overall enrollment persistence in BPS rst-choice
high schools is only about 0:32 { a mobility pattern typical of American inner-city schools. The
probability that a traditional BPS 7th grader in the Boston window enrolls in the same school
as a senior is about 0:51; for 9th graders in the Boston window (mostly applying to O'Bryant),
the re-enrollment rate falls to 0:44. Exam school oers increase enrollment persistence by 0:11
for 7th grade applicants and by 0:17 for 9th grade applicants.16 This increase weighs against
the view that unusually high exit rates from exam schools account for the ndings reported
here.
5.2 Estimates for Minorities and by Sex
Our interest in exam school eects on minority applicants is motivated in part by the contentious
debate over minority representation in these schools. Is the ght over minority representation
justied by evidence of achievement gains for minorities? In an investigation of the earnings
consequences of attendance at selective colleges and universities, Dale and Krueger (2002, 2011)
nd no overall eect. At the same time, the Dale and Krueger estimates show some evidence
of gains for minority applicants. The in
uential book-length analysis of minority admissions
preferences at selective colleges and universities by Bowen and Bok (2000) also marshals a
variety of evidence in support of the same point.
Our estimates for black and Hispanic applicants to exam schools, also reported in Table 5,
are in line with the full-sample ndings for math and middle-school ELA scores. On the other
hand, consistent with the full-sample results for 10th grade ELA, an exam school education
seems especially likely to boost 10th grade English scores for blacks and Hispanics, with an
estimated eect of 0.17. In fact, the full-sample ELA results appear to be driven primarily by
16These estimates come from a parametric reduced form analysis similar to that used to construct the covariate
balance and attrition estimates in the appendix.
16the minority impact, since the corresponding IK estimate for non-minorities is 0:07 (se=0.042).
Our investigation of dierences in student achievement by gender is motivated by long-
standing academic interest in gender gaps in achievement. For instance, Ellison and Swanson
(2010) document a substantial male advantage in elite high school math contests. The estimates
in Table 5, however, show that exam schools have little eect on math scores for boys as well
as girls, while eects on English are similar.
5.3 2SLS (Fuzzy RD) Estimates of Mediating Causal Eects
Exam school oers might aect achievement in a number of ways, most immediately through
exam school enrollment. We can also think of exam school oer eects as being mediated
by time spent attending an exam school, a measure of the intensity of educational tracking.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the most important mediator for exam school oers is
peer achievement.
Our investigation of exam school mediators uses exam school oers as instruments for me-
diating variables in a fuzzy RD analysis. This allows us to explore, for example, what the
combination of a strong peer mean rst stage and a small reduced form impact implies about
the size of peer eects. Although we can't say for sure whether any single mediator satises
an IV exclusion restriction, the bias from failures of the exclusion seems likely to be positive,
so the resulting IV estimates can be thought of as providing an upper bound on one-at-a-time
causal eects. Also relevant is the precision of the 2SLS estimates: among other things, this
tells us whether we can reject positive peer eects of the size reported elsewhere.
Fuzzy RD is implemented here using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The 2SLS setup par-
allels that used for pooled reduced form estimation (pooling applicant grades and test years,
as well as schools). Because the non-parametric analysis generates somewhat more precise es-
timates than the parametric, we focus here on IK estimates for the pooled sample. The second
stage equation in this context is similar to the stacked reduced form based on equation (4),
except that the three own-school cuto dummies are excluded and used as instruments for me-
diating variables, Mit. To economize on notation, we write the 2SLS second stage by subsuming
all controls, including year of test, grade, and application eects, and own- and other-school
running variable controls, in a vector Xitk with conformable coecient vector  k. We can then
write the second stage equation as
yitk =  
0
kXitk + Mit + itk; (5)
where Mit is the endogenous variable to be instrumented and  is the causal eect of interest.
The corresponding rst stage equations include these same controls using three own-school oer
17dummies as instruments, one for each set of applicants, stacked as when estimating equation (4).
In principle, three instruments is enough to estimate the eects of three endogenous variables at
the same time, but in practice this doesn't produce informative results. As a result, we estimate
the eects of mediating variables one at a time. The mediators considered here are either an
enrollment dummy (\in exam school the school year after application date"), years enrolled
in an exam school between application and test date, and the applicant's baseline peer mean
as experienced in the school year following exam school application. In an eort to increase
precision, we also computed 2SLS estimates adding interactions between oer dummies and
application cohort (year and grade).17
Applicants with a score above the O'Bryant cuto are 73 percentage points more likely
to enroll in an exam school and have spent about 1:5 more years at an exam school by the
time they take an MCAS test. These and other rst stage estimates are reported in Table 6.
The rst stage eects of the Latin Academy exam cuto indicators on enrollment and years
at an exam school are smaller than the O'Bryant eects because many who just miss a Latin
Academy oer end up in O'Bryant. The corresponding rst stage estimates for a Latin School
oer are small and not signicantly dierent from zero, a consequence of the fact that almost
all near misses at the Latin School end up at Latin Academy.
2SLS estimates of the eect of exam school enrollment or years of attendance are small, with
none signicantly dierent from zero (estimates for math are negative). The addition of cohort
interactions to the instrument list generates only slight precision gains, but the estimates are
reasonably precise either way. It's especially noteworthy that these estimates are precise enough
to be statistically distinguishable from the corresponding OLS estimates in Table 3, whether
the latter are estimated in models with or without ISEE controls. Compare, for example, the
2SLS estimates of the eect of exam years on math ( 0:024 with standard error of 0:033), to
the OLS estimate of 0:088 with standard error 0:016 in a model with ISEE controls.
The rst stage estimates reveal large and precisely estimated impacts of exam school oers
on applicants' peer achievement. O'Bryant oers increase average baseline peer scores by over
two-thirds of a standard deviation, while the gain is about 0:4 at the Latin Academy cuto, and
0:53   0:63 at the Latin School cuto. Consistent with the reduced form estimates, however,
the 2SLS estimates show no signicant eects of peer achievement on applicant achievement.
An important piece of information in this context is the precision of the 2SLS estimates of
peer eects, which come out signicantly dierent from the large positive OLS estimates in
Table 3. The estimated peer-eect zeros in Table 6 are also signicantly dierent from many of
the positive education peer eects reported elsewhere as well; see, e.g., Sacerdote (2001), who
17Paralleling the reduced form setup, the own-school cuto is an instrument for mediators in the sample of
applicants from that school, while other school cutos are included as controls.
18estimates college freshman GPA peer eects on the order of 0.12.
The Wrong Pond
Our investigation of peer eects is motivated by econometric research predicated on the hypoth-
esis that better peers boost achievement. At the same time, a parallel literature originating in
educational psychology explores the apparently contradictory hypothesis that high-achieving
peers are demoralizing and reduce achievement, at least for those not as strong. Marsh, Ches-
sor, Craven, and Roche (1995) and Bui, Craig, and Imberman (2011) reference this \Big Fish
Little Pond Eect" (BFLPE) as a possible explanation for the failure to nd achievement gains
in gifted and talented programs. Here, BFLPE might explain the mostly weak eects of an
exam school education since marginal admitted applicants, though positively selected relative
to where they're coming from, will typically not be at the top of an exam school class.
The 
ip side of the peer rst stage documented in Table 6 is indeed a decline in students'
percentile rank among peers. This is documented in Figures 12 and 13, which plot applicants
position in the baseline math and English score distributions. The plots show sharp drops at
admissions cutos, essentially the mirror image of the peer rst stage reported in Table 6. On
the other hand, while applicants just above the cuto at the O'Bryant school necessarily have
the lowest ISEE/GPA composite score among all those oered an O'Bryant seat, their baseline
scores place them in the middle of the baseline distribution among those oered a seat. This is
a decline from about the 75th percentile of the baseline test score among non-oered peers. The
baseline score ranking of marginal Latin Academy and Latin School applicants fall similarly
though somewhat less sharply over a range in the middle of the relevant distributions.
We investigate BFLPE more formally by allowing for interactions between exam school
enrollment and the dierence between applicant achievement and those of peers at the targeted
exam school. The idea here is to check the BFLPE prediction that students who enroll in
exam schools where they can expect to be substantially weaker than classmates gain less or
lose more than those with baseline achievement at the peer mean or better. To formalize this,
let bi denote applicant i's baseline score and  b(i)k be the the peer mean at an applicant's target
exam school. The potential peer gap at the applicant's target school is
gik = (bi   b(i)k):
Adding peer gap interactions to a second-stage equation that captures causal eects of exam
school enrollment, Eit, we have
yitk =  
0
kXitk + 0Eit + 1Eitgik + itk; (6)
19with two endogenous variables: Eit (exam school enrollment) and Eitgik (exam school enroll-
ment interacted with the potential peer gap). The instruments in this case are oer cuto
indicators, Dik, and the cuto indicator times the potential peer gap, Dikgik.
We estimated equation (6) in the pooled sample of 7th and 9th grade applicants with stacked
schools and pooled MCAS test outcomes. This generates 2SLS estimates of 1 of about  0:078
(se = 0:078) for math and  0:119 (se = 0:080) for ELA.18 The fact that the impact of exam
school enrollment seems to be decreasing in the gap between an applicant's baseline ability and
that of his peers at the targeted schools suggests the BFLPE mechanism plays little or no role
in mediating the overall exam school impacts reported here.
5.4 External Validity
RD non-parametrically identies causal eects for those near treatment cutos. How limiting
is this? In the Boston exam school context, it seems worth emphasizing that the three cutos
in our sample cover a wide range of ability. Among 7th grade applicants, the O'Bryant cuto
falls near the median of the ISEE distribution while the Latin School cuto reaches the 75th
quantile. Among 9th grade applicants, the O'Bryant cuto falls near the 60th quantile, the
Latin Academy cuto is near the 87th quantile, and the Latin School cuto reaches the 92nd
quantile. It's impressive that the eects of clearing these widely spaced thresholds are similar.
This robustness notwithstanding, we'd also like to say something about how an exam school
education aects achievement for unusually high achievers, even within the exam school pop-
ulation. We brie
y explore two approaches to this question, the rst based on covariates and
the second an extrapolation using functional form.
High Achievers
To further explore consistency across quantiles of the applicant ability distribution, we exploit
the fact any single test is necessarily a noisy measure of ability. Although we can't construct
(non-parametric) RD estimates for, say, O'Bryant students with ISEE scores in the upper tail
of the score distribution, we can look separately at subsamples of students with especially high
baseline MCAS scores. Some in the high-baseline group are ultra-high achievers who landed in
a marginal ISEE group by chance.
The average baseline score for students in the upper half of the baseline MCAS distribution
hovers around 1:2   1:4 in both math and English. Importantly, MCAS scores remain infor-
mative even for these high achievers: no more than one third top out in the sense of testing
18These are IK estimates in models that control for a potential peer gap main eect scores. Models swapping
the potential peer gap with baseline scores generate virtually identical results since the leave-one-out peer mean
is essentially a linear combination of the complete peer mean and the individual baseline score.
20at the Advanced (highest) MCAS prociency level. Likewise, MCAS remains informative even
for applicants in the upper baseline MCAS quartile. It's therefore of interest to see what RD
estimates of exam school applicants look like for students with such high baseline MCAS scores,
an inquiry made possible by the fact that some of these high-baseline applicants have ISEE
scores close to admissions cutos.
Perhaps surprisingly, RD estimates for applicants in the upper half and upper quartile of
the baseline score distribution come out essentially similar to those for the full sample. These
results, reported in columns 1-4 of Table 7, are mostly negative with few signicantly dierent
from zero. The exception again is a signicant positive eect for 10th grade ELA. At the same
time, the sample of high achievers generates a signicant negative estimate of eects on middle
school ELA { an eect of roughly the same magnitude as the positive ELA estimate for 10th
graders. Thus, even in a sample of ultra high (baseline) achievers, there is little evidence of a
consistent exam school boost.
Extrapolation Away from Cutos
The previous analysis looks at students with high baseline values, but says nothing about
eects for applicants with ISEE scores above admissions cutos. Perhaps the ISEE has score
special signicance. For example, once admitted to an exam school, students may be tracked
(perhaps implicitly) on the basis of their ISEE scores. Moreover, in ongoing theoretical work,
Ellison (2011) argues that in school systems that sort by ability across campuses, the optimal
design has no discontinuity in score levels at admissions cutos, though we should see the score
gradient get steeper for those admitted to a more challenging program. We'd therefore like to
say something about treatment eects to the right of exam school admissions cutos.
Parametric RD identies causal eects along the entire support of the running variable, an
important feature of the parametric approach noted by Angrist and Pischke (2009). To see this,
begin by letting E[y0ijri] and E[y1ijri] denote the conditional expectation functions (CEFs)
for potential outcomes indexed against treatment assignment fyji;j = 0;1g and conditional on
the running variable (here we suppress the application school subscript, k.) Modeling both of
these CEFs with pth-order polynomials, we have
E[y0ijri] =  + 01ri + 02r
2
i + ::: + 0pr
p
i;
E[y1ijri] =  +  + 11ri + 12r
2
i + ::: + 1pr
p
i:
Since Di is a deterministic function of ri, we can write
E[yijri] = E[y0ijri] + E[y1i   y0ijri]Di:
21Finally, substituting polynomials for conditional expectations, we have
yi =  + 01ri + 02r
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while the treatment eect at the cuto is just .
Figure 14 illustrates the extrapolation implicit in parametric estimates of causal eects
away from the cuto. We observe E[y0ijri] to the left of the cuto and E[y1ijri] to the right.
But identication of treatment eects at ri = c > 0 requires knowledge of E[y0ijri = c]. A
parametric model for E[y0ijri] constructs the missing counterfactual mean of y0i to the right of
the cuto by extrapolating E[y0ijri] from the left, generating the parametric estimand labeled
A(c) in the gure.
The problem with parametric extrapolation is that the parametric model may be incorrect.
Suppose, for example, that the mean of y0i to the right of the cuto is described by the upper
dotted line to the right of the cuto in Figure 14. Then the causal eect at c is B(c). An inter-
esting question in this context is whether eects away from the cuto are non-parametrically
identied. In other words, given an innitely large sample, could we tell whether A(c) or B(c)
is the right answer? Without constraining the behavior of the underlying CEF in some way,
the answer is no, even if we impose smoothness on the underlying functions. As suggested by
the gure, whatever shape a continuously dierentiable E[y0ijri] takes to the left of the cuto,
there are many continuously dierentiable pieces (continuous at the cuto) consistent with this
to the right. This suggests that continuous dierentiability alone is not strong enough to allow
us to extrapolate E[y0ijri] from left to right.
Stronger regularity assumptions restricting the behavior of E[y0ijri] buy more in the way
of identication. Suppose we're prepared to assume that E[y0ijri] is an analytic function over
the interval we're concerned with, that is, from the cuto through the intended extrapolation
point. This means that on this interval, the function can be written as a power series or,
equivalently, that a Taylor approximation converges to it. We can then imagine improving the
approximation to the left of the cuto to the point where we eventually learn what E[y0ijri = c]
is up to any desired level of accuracy. It seems reasonable to presume, however, that in practice
the quality of a pro
igate approximation is likely to be limited. As an empirical matter, it
makes sense to settle for some low-order polynomial such as the cubic used here. (And, in any
22case, the question of whether the underlying CEF is analytic seems hard to assess.)
Recently, Dong and Lewbel (2011) propose a derivative-based approach to RD extrapolation
in the neighborhood of the cuto, beginning with the observation that given continuous dier-
entiability of the underlying CEFs, the derivative of the treatment eect at the cuto, 0(0),
is non-parametrically identied.19 Dong and Lewbel use this fact to motivate an approximate
treatment eect
(c)  (0) + 
0(0)  c;
interpreting this as the eect were the cuto to be moved by a small amount. Let g1(ri) and
g0(ri) denote the continuously dierentiable CEFs for potential outcomes. With cuto at zero,
the treatment eect moving the cuto to the right is
E[y1i   y0ijri = c] = g1(c)   g0(c):
Dong and Lewbel's \move-the-cuto" extrapolation uses derivatives to approximate both g1(c)
and g0(c). Here, we use a similar local derivative argument to approximate the treatment eect
for someone with ri = c for small c when the cuto is xed at zero. Move-the-cuto and away-
from-the-cuto eects are the same when the location of the cuto has no impact on potential
outcomes.
Our extrapolation exploits the fact that we only need to impute g0(c); g1(c) is non-
parametrically identied. We therefore impute eects away from the cuto using the fact
that g0(c)  g0(0) + g0
0(0)  c. The idea behind this is rendered in Figure 14 as the vertical
distance falling from E[y1ijri = c] to the line tangent to E[y0ijri = 0]. This approximation
distinguishes between possible counterfactuals according to where g0(ri) is headed in a small
neighborhood of the cuto. Of course, two functions might have the same rst derivative and
yet be headed in dierent directions. In that case, we could look to higher-order derivatives to
tell them apart, though the payo to additional approximation terms falls o quickly, since the
rate at which non-parametric estimates of derivatives converge falls with the order of dierenti-
ation (Stone, 1982). Derivate-based approximation is not guaranteed to answer the substantive
question of interest in our context, which is whether treatment eects increase as the running
variable increases. On the other hand, we might indeed be interested in what happens just
to the right of the cuto, which in this case means not being among the very last applicants
admitted to an exam school.
We constructed non-parametric estimates of g1(c) by local linear regression with bandwidth
centered at c. The imputed g0(c) was constructed from local linear estimates of the slope and
19The identication argument here is similar to that invoked for non-parametric identication of the treatment
eect itself; see, e.g., Li and Racine (2007).
23intercept in a bandwidth-determined neighborhood just to the left of the cuto, as implemented
earlier for RD estimates at the cuto. The imputed treatment eect at c can be obtained from
these pieces in one go by kernel-weighted estimation of equation (4). In this case, however,
although we want the estimates to the left to be constructed at the cuto as before, estimates
to the right use a weighting scheme centered at the extrapolation point, c. This is accomplished
by using a kernel that recenters to the right:
K(~ uik) = 1j~ uikj1(1   j~ uikj);
where ~ uik =
rik Dic
h and h is the bandwidth.
Parametric extrapolation results for c = 1 and c = 5 for a sample combining applicants for
all three schools are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 7.20 These estimates show no
evidence of a positive treatment eect for higher scoring students, though the extrapolation
5 units out is very imprecise. Dong-Lewbel extrapolation produces precisely estimated zeros
for extrapolated math eects one unit to the right of the cuto, as can be seen in column (7).
Non-parametric extrapolation of ELA eects generates results similar to those at the cuto,
showing a signicant negative eects on middle school math and a signcant positive eect on
10th grade reading. The similarity of the non-parametrically extrapolated estimates to those
at the cuto is a consequence of the small interaction terms generated by IK estimation of the
reduced form. The estimated interactions appear in column (8), which reports IK estimates of
the slope change at the cuto.
5.5 Other Boston Outcomes
PSAT and SAT Scores
MCAS scores are measures of achievement that, with the exception of the 10th grade test that
also serves an as an exit exam, are only indirectly linked to ultimate educational attainment.
We also look at additional test outcomes that are highly correlated with MCAS scores, but may
be more important.21 The rst of these is the Preliminary SAT/National Merit Scholarship
Qualifying Test (PSAT/NMSQT), which serves as a warmup for the SAT and is used in the
National Merit scholarship program; the second is the SAT Reasoning Test itself (formerly, the
Scholastic Aptitude Test).
20As in the earlier reduced form All-Schools estimates, the specication allows school-specic running variable
eects, but the cuto main eect and the interactions between the cuto and the running variable terms are
restricted to be the same across schools.
21The correlation between 10th grade MCAS Math and PSAT or SAT is about 0.7; the correlation for English
is similar. These estimates come from models with the same controls as in Table 3 (without ISEE scores).
24SAT and PSAT tests are usually taken towards the end of high school, so scores are un-
available for the youngest applicant cohorts in our sample (appendix Table C2 lists included
cohorts). In March 2005, the College Board added a writing section to the SAT. Since the writ-
ing section does not appear in earlier years, we focus on the sum of Critical Reading (Verbal)
and Mathematics scores, also known as the SAT Reasoning score. As with MCAS outcomes,
SAT and PSAT are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance among all test-takers in
a given year.22
The average PSAT score for applicants in the Boston window (Critical Reading and Math)
is 91.3, while the average SAT score is 1019. These can be compared with 2010 national average
PSAT and SAT scores of 94 and 1017.
Consistent with the MCAS results discussed above, Figures 15 and 16 show no apparent
discontinuity in either PSAT or SAT scores for students near admissions cutos. The points
plotted in these two gures are necessarily for students who took the PSAT or SAT. We report
reduced form oer eects for the probability of taking tests as well as for scores conditional on
taking. These results are reported in Table 8 for both tests.
Exam school oers increase the likelihood of taking the PSAT by about ve percentage
points overall, with the boost coming mostly near the O'Bryant cuto. PSAT scores among
takers appear to be mostly unaected by exam school oers. For a subsample of black and
Hispanic applicants, the impact on PSAT participation is 0.08 (se = 0.03). Increased PSAT-
taking does not seem to have had much of an eect on SAT-taking, where the estimates are
almost all small and insignicant. Selection bias in the sample of test takers seems likely to be
second order, especially for SATs.
As with the MCAS, the SAT results here oer little in the evidence of consistent score gains.
The estimated SAT score eects point to a gain for 9th grade applicants SAT scores, emerging
most strongly at the Latin Academy and Latin School. 9th grade applicants are a minority of
the exam school population; when pooled with the sample of 7th grade applicants, this eect
fades considerably. Likewise, estimates for black and Hispanic students suggest an SAT boost
in 9th grade at two schools (0.31 with se=0.13 at Latin Academy and 0.17 with se=0.08 at
Latin School), but the overall SAT eect for minority students is 0.04, with se=0.04.
AP Tests
Motivated by the prevalence of AP courses in the Boston exam school curriculum, we estimated
exam school eects on AP taking and AP scores. As with the PSAT/SAT analysis, younger
cohorts are excluded since these tests are usually taken in grades 11-12 (again, appendix Table
C2 gives details).
22We use the rst score recorded in the Boston Public Schools SAT and PSAT les.
25AP tests are scored on a scale of 1-5 and some colleges grant credit for some AP subjects
in which an applicant scores at least 3 or 4. At the high end, Latin School students take an
average of three to four AP exams. At the same time, Figure 17 shows little evidence of a
jump in the number of tests taken at any exam school cuto. Figure 18 looks at the sum of
AP scores, awarding zeros for tests not taken. This gure also oers no evidence that exam
schools increase AP success rates.
The estimates that go with Figures 17 and 18 appear in Table 9. Here we look at sums
and scores for all AP exams, as well as for a subset of the most popular exams, dened as
those taken by at least 500 students in our BPS score le. This restriction narrows the set of
exams to include subjects like math, science, english, history, and economics, but omits music
and art.23 Overall there is little impact on the number of AP exams taken. In the analysis of
eects on popular tests, a positive eect on the sum of scores for O'Bryant 7th grade applicants
is oset by negative eects at the other two schools. On balance, therefore, it seems unlikely
that exam school enrollment improves AP-related outcomes. Results for black and Hispanic
applicants support a similar conclusion in this case.
6 New York Estimates
Results for New York are presented here in a format much like that used for Boston, though more
brie
y. We focus on the three oldest academic New York exam schools: Brooklyn Technical,
Bronx Science, and Stuyvesant.
Data from New York City comes from three sources: enrollment and registration les con-
taining demographic information and attendance records; application and assignment les; and
the Regents exam le. Our analysis covers four 9th grade applicant cohorts (from 2004-2007),
with follow up test score information through 2009. The data appendix explains how these les
were processed in detail.
6.1 New York Admissions
The New York exam school admissions process is simpler than the Boston process because
selection is based solely on performance on the Specialized High School Achievement Test
(SHSAT), whereas Boston schools rely on school-specic composites. New York 8th graders
interested in an exam school seat take the SHSAT and submit an application listing school
preferences (we omit a handful of 9th grade applicants). Students are ordered by SHSAT
23Tests with at least 500 takers are Calculus AB/BC, Statistics, Biology, Chemistry, Physics B/C, English
Language and Composition, English Literature and Composition, European History, US Government and Pol-
itics, US History, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics.
26scores. Seats are then allocated down this ranking, with the top scorer getting his rst choice,
the second highest scorer get his most preferred choice among schools with remaining seats,
and so on.24
As in Boston, we standardized and centered the running variable for each school. Let Ck
denote the minimum rank score needed for a seat at school k and let Ri denote the rank of
student i. Stuyvesant is the most competitive exam school, so the minimum score needed to
obtain an oer exceeds the minimum at Bronx Science and Brooklyn Technical. We construct
a school-specic running variable as




where Ik are students who ranked school k. These normalized running variables equal zero
at each cuto, with positive values indicating those who obtain an oer. Also as in Boston,
applicants can qualify for placement at one school, but rank a less competitive school rst
and get an oer at that school instead. Note that New York admissions are based on a single
underlying running variable, while school-specic running variables in Boston are correlated
but distinct. New York cutos are typically separated by six standardized rank units using the
formula above.
The descriptive statistics in Table 10 show that New York exam school applicants are
positively selected relative to the population of New York 8th graders. Applicants' baseline
scores exceed those of other 8th graders by about 0:7   0:8, while the score gap for oered
students is 1:7 1:8. Exam school applicants re
ect the New York public school population in
that a substantial fraction are eligible for a subsidized lunch. In contrast to Boston, however,
only about 15% of New York's oered students are black or Hispanic.
In (unreported) OLS models paralleling those used to construct the estimates in Table 3,
exam school exposure in New York is associated with a large achievement advantage, whether
exposure is measured by enrollment, exam years, or peer means. Most of these estimates remain
substantial even after controlling for SHSAT scores. For example, in models without SHSAT
controls, the peer mean coecient for Advanced Math is 0:47. This falls to 0:17 with a linear
control for SHSAT scores, still a large and precisely estimated eect.
24The NYC exam school assignment mechanism is a serial dictatorship with students ordered by the admis-
sions test score. Though exam school assignment is a distinct process, students apply for exam schools at the
same time they rank regular New York high schools, and may receive oers from both. Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak,
and Roth (2009) describe how exam school admissions interacts with admissions at regular high schools.
276.2 RD Plots and Estimates
The estimation window for each of the New York schools is set at [+5; 5]. The New York
window is narrower than the Boston window of +/-10 because there are many more New York
applicants, so the sample is much larger than Boston's even in a window half the size, and
because trimming at ve greatly mitigates problems of interpretation due to confounding from
nearby admissions cutos (as described in Figure 7). As noted above, cutos are separated by
about six standardized units - the separation in this case is clearer than for Boston because
New York admissions rely on a single underlying running variable.
Figure 19 shows how New York oers are related to the running variable. Although the
estimation sample is ve units wide in each direction, the plot window runs for 10 units to
show behavior outside the window. The dots in Figure 19 plot averages in half-unit bins, while
the tted lines in the plots are IK estimates using the bandwidth generated in the estimation
sample. Own-school oers jump at each cuto, but ve or six points to the right of the Brooklyn
Tech and Bronx Science cutos, oers at the next school up replace those at the target schools.
(Oers at other schools remain positive just to the right of the Bronx Science cuto because
some Bronx Science applicants who qualify for admission there ranked Brooklyn Tech rst,
perhaps because they live in the neighborhood.)
Oers at each exam school lead to enrollment at that school, though the oer-to-enrollment
conversion rate diers across schools. This pattern is documented in Figure 20. Enrollment
jumps at the Brooklyn Tech and Bronx Science cutos are lower than the corresponding oer
jumps, though both enrollment jumps remain substantial. The Stuyvesant enrollment jump is
about as large as the oer jump, implying that nearly all oered a seat at Stuyvesant enroll
there. This pattern is mirrored in a plot of average years of exam school exposure against the
New York running variables, shown in Figure 21.25
New York has considerable school choice, with other selective schools outside the set of
traditional exam schools. Admission to one of these schools is nevertheless associated with a
sharp jump in peer achievement, as can be seen in Figures 22-23. The average baseline math
and English score of peers increases by about 0:5 for math and 0:4 for English near the
Brooklyn Tech cuto. The jump is smaller for Bronx Science and Stuyvesant, though still
substantial at about 0:2.
Although New York exam school exposure jumps at admissions cutos, there is little ev-
idence of a corresponding discontinuity in achievement. This is apparent in Figures 24 and
25, which plot performance on the Advanced Math and English components of the New York
Regents exam against the standardized New York running variables. These results are con-
25Exposure is capped at two or three years for the last two applicant cohorts since our registration les end
before these students nish high school.
28rmed in Table 11, which reports parametric and IK reduced-form estimates of oer eects
on Advanced Math and English as well as for other Regents test outcomes. The estimated
equations are like equations (2) and (4) for applicants in the [ 5;+5] interval.26
The New York estimates are precise enough to rule out even modest score gains. For
example, the IK estimate of the eect on English in the stacked sample is 0:01, with a standard
error also around 0:01. The few signicant pooled estimates in Table 11 are negative.
Using models and estimation procedure similar to those used to construct 2SLS estimates
of mediating eects for Boston, we computed 2SLS estimates of the eects of enrollment, exam
years, and baseline peer means on student achievement for New York. These results, along
with the associated rst stage estimates, are reported in Table 12. Just as in Boston, oers at
the rst two NYC exam schools increase enrollment and time spent at an exam school, though
rst-stage enrollment eects are not signicantly dierent from zero at Stuyvesant. Admission
to any of these three schools generates a substantial jump in peer achievement, as much as half
a standard deviation at Brooklyn Tech. As in Boston, however, the 2SLS estimates of peer and
other mediating eects come out close to zero.
Estimates for subgroups of minorities and by sex in New York appear in Appendix Table
B3. Unlike Boston, New York's exam schools do not appear to boost Regents achievement
for blacks and Hispanics. Moreover, neither boys nor girls appear to score higher because of
exam school attendance. The models with baseline interactions and extrapolations away from
cutos are in Appendix Table B4. Few of the estimates for high achievers are signicantly
dierent from zero and most are negative, in line with the Boston ndings. The results from
the extrapolation are also mostly zeroes, though they are less precise further away from the
cuto.
6.3 Pooling Boston and New York
To maximize precision, we used the combined Boston and New York samples to construct pooled
2SLS estimates of mediating eects. The models here parallel those used to construct the single-
city stacked estimates, with a full set of covariate interactions for each city included as controls.
The multi-city results appear in Table 13, again reported for two sets of instruments. Pooling
indeed generates a precision gain relative to the single-city 2SLS estimates, and reinforces the
main ndings showing no overall peer or other mediating eects. The most precisely estimated
eects of exam years come with standard errors of 0:02, while the corresponding peer eects
have estimated standard errors on the order of 0:03.
26The IK bandwidth in the Table 11 estimates ranges from 3-11.
297 Summary and Conclusions
The results reported here show only scattered test score gains due to an exam school education,
even for students with relatively high baseline scores. Because the exam school experience is
associated with exposure to high-achieving peers and a decline in the relative standing of
successful applicants in comparison to peers, these results weigh against the importance of peer
eects in the education production function. The outcome that appears to be most strengthened
by exam school attendance is the 10th grade ELA score, a result that appears to be driven
by gains for minorities. We also nd evidence of SAT score gains for a subset of 9th grade
applicants, but not enough to boost SAT scores signicantly overall. The high achievers in our
samples clearly have good outcomes, but most of these students would have done well without
the benet of an exam school education.
It's interesting to contrast the results reported here with those from recent studies of Boston
and New York charter schools using quasi-experimental research designs. Abdulkadiro glu,
Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Pathak (2011) and Dobbie and Fryer (2011a) show substantial
gains from attendance at charter schools that embrace the No Excuses pedagogical model.
Many of these schools serve exceptionally low achievers. Moreover, the relationship between
baseline ability and treatment eects within the urban charter population appears to be negative
(Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, Pathak, and Walters, 2010; Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2011).
The results reported here, showing evidence of achievement gains for minorities, are therefore
broadly consistent with the charter ndings. The comparison between No Excuses charters
and exam schools also suggests that the scope for improvement in learning may be wider at
the low end of the ability distribution than at the top. Together, these ndings weigh against
the view expressed recently by Cunha and Heckman (2007), among others, that \... returns to
adolescent education for the most disadvantaged and less able are lower than the returns for
the more advantaged" (page 33).
Of course, test scores are only part of the picture. It seems likely, for example, that the
Boston Latin School improves students' knowledge of Latin. The many clubs and activities at
some exam schools may, perhaps, expose students to ideas and concepts not easily captured
by achievement tests. The certication that comes with an exam school education might open
doors at elite colleges and universities though Dobbie and Fryer's (2011b) recent analysis of
college matriculation and enrollment for New York city exam school students weighs against
this possibility. In any case, if there are other later life gains, our estimates suggest they operate
through channels other than increased cognitive achievement.
Finally, our results are relevant to the broader debate on the impacts of school choice as
expressed in analyses by Hoxby (2003), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), Rothstein (2006), MacLeod
and Urquiola (2009), among others. The heavy rates of oversubscription for exam schools
30together with the lack of broad achievement eects suggests that parents either mistakenly
equate good peers with high value added, or that they value exam schools for reasons other
than their impact on learning. Both of these scenarios reduce the likelihood that parental choice
has strong demand-side eects on the production of human capital in schools.
31Middle School High School Middle School High School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Peer Mean in Math ‐0.251 ‐0.346 1.508 1.345 0.850 1.159 1.864
Baseline Peer Mean in English ‐0.252 ‐0.274 1.371 1.096 0.731 1.050 1.565
Student/Teacher ratio 12.4 15.2 21.3 21.1 19.6 21.2 22.0
Teachers licensed to teach assignment 87.7% 89.2% 96.3% 96.6% 97.4% 95.9% 96.4%
Core academic teachers identified as highly qualified 84.7% 85.0% 94.0% 93.9% 92.7% 93.8% 94.7%
Teachers above age 40 46.6% 47.4% 54.4% 55.3% 63.4% 51.7% 52.9%
Teachers above age 48 31.9% 35.3% 42.0% 43.0% 51.3% 38.3% 41.2%
Teachers above age 56 11.8% 13.8% 21.4% 22.1% 27.1% 18.7% 21.3%
Number of teachers 46.1 63.1 91.5 89.0 64.5 79.0 110.3
Total number of teachers in core academic areas 37.9 51.7 77.4 76.1 55.7 64.7 95.2












High schools include all schools with positive enrollment in at least one of grades 9, 10, 11, and 12. All Exam Offered Enrolled All Exam Offered Enrolled
Boston Applicants Students Students Boston Applicants Students Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female 0.479 0.536 0.559 0.562 0.476 0.540 0.614 0.602
Black 0.478 0.386 0.245 0.239 0.505 0.493 0.361 0.367
Hispanic 0.301 0.199 0.158 0.149 0.331 0.243 0.233 0.215
Free Lunch 0.725 0.717 0.630 0.626 0.762 0.805 0.783 0.799
LEP
‡ 0.201 0.139 0.110 0.110 0.181 0.130 0.117 0.133
SPED
¥ 0.232 0.045 0.009 0.009 0.250 0.079 0.019 0.015
N 61,161 13,730 6,418 5,652 30,484 5,540 1,461 1,095
Math ‐0.017 0.758 1.399 1.436 ‐0.313 0.227 1.036 1.058
English ‐0.020 0.725 1.286 1.315 ‐0.246 0.275 0.835 0.824













one non‐missing value for the variable listed.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Enrollment 0.990*** 0.272*** 0.788*** 0.247***
(0.049) (0.032) (0.043) (0.028)
Exam Years 0.361*** 0.088*** 0.314*** 0.121***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
Peer Mean 0.610*** 0.110*** 0.558*** 0.154***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.023)
N 24349 24368 20650 24349 24368 20650 22737 22750 21453 22737 22750 21453







quantitative, reading, and math sections of the test. Robust standard errors, clustered on year and school at the time of testing, are shown in parentheses.Latin Latin All Latin Latin All
Application Test O'Bryant Academy School Schools O'Bryant Academy School Schools
Grade Grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
7th 7th and 8th ‐0.121 ‐0.029 ‐0.038 ‐0.062 ‐0.091 ‐0.037 ‐0.026 ‐0.049
(0.115) (0.114) (0.112) (0.061) (0.069) (0.065) (0.072) (0.036)
2779 2856 2610 8245 2590 2856 2537 7983
7th and 9th 10th 0.015 ‐0.031 ‐0.059 ‐0.024 0.051 ‐0.035 ‐0.063* ‐0.011
(0.099) (0.078) (0.065) (0.043) (0.055) (0.044) (0.035) (0.027)
1876 1822 1606 5304 1876 1803 1474 5153
7th and 9th 7th, 8th, and 10th ‐0.065 ‐0.030 ‐0.046 ‐0.047 ‐0.030 ‐0.036 ‐0.038 ‐0.035
(0.086) (0.085) (0.076) (0.046) (0.051) (0.045) (0.052) (0.027)
4655 4678 4216 13549 4466 4659 4011 13136
7th 7th and 8th  ‐0.186* ‐0.079 ‐0.125 ‐0.129*** ‐0.091 ‐0.023 ‐0.115** ‐0.079**
(0.107) (0.079) (0.085) (0.050) (0.061) (0.052) (0.046) (0.031)
2505 2549 2257 7311 2087 1992 2173 6252
7th and 9th 10th 0.037 0.216* 0.058 0.103* 0.133** 0.206*** 0.045 0.130***
(0.104) (0.121) (0.086) (0.061) (0.060) (0.058) (0.064) (0.036)
1879 1825 1609 5313 1879 1633 1543 5055
7th and 9th 7th, 8th, and 10th ‐0.088 0.046 ‐0.049 ‐0.030 0.025 0.091* ‐0.045 0.022
(0.074) (0.079) (0.072) (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.046) (0.028)















Grade Grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
7th 7th and 8th ‐0.014 ‐0.137* ‐0.078 ‐0.032 ‐0.016 ‐0.060
(0.065) (0.077) (0.052) (0.047) (0.059) (0.049)
2363 1569 3759 3410 3386 4547
7th and 9th 10th ‐0.031 ‐0.040 ‐0.031 ‐0.018 0.052 ‐0.051
(0.051) (0.070) (0.049) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036)
1588 1001 2495 2281 2165 2990
7th and 9th 7th,  8th, and 10th ‐0.021 ‐0.098* ‐0.059 ‐0.026 0.014 ‐0.057
(0.047) (0.057) (0.039) (0.033) (0.042) (0.036)
3951 2570 6254 5691 5551 7537
7th 7th and 8th ‐0.026 ‐0.143** ‐0.059 ‐0.083** ‐0.058 ‐0.079*
(0.047) (0.070) (0.043) (0.042) (0.052) (0.041)
2187 1431 3548 3144 2780 3829
7th and 9th 10th 0.192*** 0.117 0.173*** 0.070* 0.144*** 0.109***
(0.053) (0.080) (0.046) (0.042) (0.051) (0.042)
1560 962 2673 2355 2027 3028
7th and 9th 7th,  8th, and 10th 0.065 ‐0.048 0.045 ‐0.017 0.028 0.005
(0.042) (0.062) (0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.037)







B. English(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Enrollment ‐0.050 0.053 ‐0.010 0.032
(0.069) (0.058) (0.066) (0.057)
Exam Years ‐0.024 0.026 0.003 0.018
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Peer Mean ‐0.089* ‐0.001 ‐0.040 0.001
(0.049) (0.052) (0.043) (0.046)
O'Bryant 0.730*** 1.530*** 0.753*** 0.737*** 1.403*** 0.687***
(0.064) (0.125) (0.073) (0.068) (0.127) (0.070)
Latin Academy 0.118** 0.219* 0.388*** 0.142** 0.227 0.378***
(0.057) (0.128) (0.085) (0.062) (0.143) (0.079)
Latin School 0.032 0.072 0.628*** 0.022 0.045 0.534***
(0.022) (0.053) (0.093) (0.022) (0.058) (0.080)

















Grade Grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
7th 7th and 8th 1.445 ‐0.104** 2.045 ‐0.040 ‐0.143 ‐0.740 ‐0.049 0.001
(0.050) (0.087) (0.107) (0.646) (0.039) (0.007)
3768 3831 1723 1742 8245 8245 7983 7983
7th and 9th 10th 1.334 ‐0.007 1.779 ‐0.020 ‐0.058 ‐0.352 ‐0.016 ‐0.006
(0.028) (0.031) (0.072) (0.430) (0.028) (0.006)
3469 3163 1935 1948 5304 5304 5153 5153
7th and 9th 7th,  8th, and 10th 1.392 ‐0.060* 1.904 ‐0.029 ‐0.109 ‐0.586 ‐0.036 ‐0.001
(0.032) (0.047) (0.079) (0.465) (0.029) (0.006)
7237 6994 3658 3690 13549 13549 13136 13136
7th 7th and 8th 1.336 ‐0.095*** 1.758 ‐0.114** ‐0.166** ‐0.677 ‐0.075** 0.004
(0.036) (0.058) (0.081) (0.487) (0.033) (0.007)
4159 3767 1922 1752 7311 7311 6252 6252
7th and 9th 10th 1.200 0.074* 1.501 0.087** 0.023 ‐0.619 0.130*** 0.000
(0.039) (0.043) (0.089) (0.475) (0.038) (0.005)
3206 3065 1770 1568 5313 5313 5055 5055
7th and 9th 7th,  8th, and 10th 1.277 ‐0.013 1.635 ‐0.022 ‐0.085 ‐0.657* 0.022 0.001
(0.033) (0.046) (0.068) (0.380) (0.030) (0.004)










Baseline in Upper Half Baseline in Upper Quartile Parametric Non‐parametric (IK)Latin Latin All Latin Latin All
Application O'Bryant Academy School Schools O'Bryant Academy School Schools
Grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
7th 0.101** 0.103** ‐0.072 0.050* 0.048 ‐0.075 0.021 0.001
(0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.030) (0.074) (0.060) (0.067) (0.036)
1366 1348 1164 3878 917 965 890 2772
9th 0.116** ‐0.008 0.113 0.073** ‐0.100 0.205*** 0.036 0.036
(0.056) (0.053) (0.071) (0.034) (0.104) (0.068) (0.120) (0.055)
889 701 442 2032 478 376 328 1182
7th and 9th 0.107*** 0.069* ‐0.034 0.058** 0.004 0.007 0.025 0.011
(0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.023) (0.059) (0.050) (0.063) (0.032)
2255 2049 1606 5910 1395 1341 1218 3954
7th 0.060 0.111** 0.026 0.067** 0.091 ‐0.107* 0.111 0.020
(0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.031) (0.085) (0.057) (0.083) (0.042)
1349 1354 1207 3910 623 855 860 2338
9th 0.040 ‐0.065 0.019 0.003 0.017 0.360*** 0.189** 0.139**
(0.064) (0.069) (0.078) (0.039) (0.083) (0.111) (0.081) (0.056)
859 716 533 2108 550 318 299 1167
7th and 9th 0.052 0.057 0.024 0.046* 0.052 0.001 0.129* 0.059*
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.025) (0.063) (0.043) (0.069) (0.035)







B. SATLatin Latin All Latin Latin All
Application O'Bryant Academy School Schools O'Bryant Academy School Schools
Grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
7th 0.180 ‐0.099 0.205 0.110 1.049*** ‐0.205 0.573 0.562**
(0.149) (0.233) (0.176) (0.091) (0.359) (0.671) (0.491) (0.266)
864 787 898 2549 864 724 868 2456
9th ‐0.127 0.100 ‐0.103 ‐0.057 ‐0.004 0.849 ‐0.181 0.188
(0.262) (0.318) (0.367) (0.142) (0.605) (1.086) (1.232) (0.392)
626 391 370 1387 509 342 342 1193
7th and 9th 0.065 ‐0.033 0.120 0.055 0.710* 0.126 0.378 0.450**
(0.162) (0.207) (0.178) (0.084) (0.365) (0.560) (0.487) (0.227)
1490 1178 1268 3936 1373 1066 1210 3649
7th 0.108 ‐0.105 0.020 0.022 0.690** ‐0.458 0.073 0.209
(0.131) (0.212) (0.157) (0.074) (0.287) (0.585) (0.452) (0.196)
864 699 867 2430 864 652 859 2375
9th ‐0.285 0.141 ‐0.353 ‐0.171 ‐0.435 0.901 ‐0.602 ‐0.105
(0.248) (0.288) (0.320) (0.138) (0.518) (1.009) (0.961) (0.363)
580 444 401 1425 482 363 402 1247
7th and 9th ‐0.035 ‐0.009 ‐0.093 ‐0.046 0.351 0.026 ‐0.134 0.110
(0.146) (0.183) (0.161) (0.076) (0.291) (0.527) (0.434) (0.176)










B. Exams with 500+ TakersAll Exam Offered Enrolled Brooklyn Bronx
NYC Applicants Students Students Tech Science Stuyvesant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 0.487 0.503 0.456 0.426 0.415 0.443 0.429
Black 0.336 0.299 0.078 0.076 0.133 0.040 0.019
Hispanic 0.377 0.248 0.073 0.067 0.089 0.070 0.030
Free Lunch
# 0.667 0.685 0.671 0.681 0.664 0.682 0.706
LEP 0.125 0.039 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003
SPED 0.089 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 453233 84539 11914 9364 4255 2405 2704
Math ‐0.004 0.779 1.780 1.802 1.619 1.771 2.119
English ‐0.005 0.709 1.714 1.667 1.426 1.666 2.047












NYSED Math and Reading. LEP means Limited English Proficient.  SPED means Special Education.Brooklyn Tech Bronx Science Stuyvesant All Schools Brooklyn Tech Bronx Science Stuyvesant All Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math  0.083 ‐0.096* ‐0.056 ‐0.021 0.012 ‐0.129*** ‐0.037 ‐0.056***
(0.064) (0.056) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040) (0.033) (0.038) (0.018)
4264 3746 3800 11810 3743 3746 3417 10906
Advanced Math ‐0.029 ‐0.024 ‐0.030 ‐0.028 0.000 ‐0.059 ‐0.022 ‐0.025
(0.080) (0.072) (0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.027) (0.021)
5619 5524 6584 17727 5619 5524 6584 17727
English 0.028 ‐0.035 ‐0.028 ‐0.013 0.051 ‐0.018 ‐0.005 0.013
(0.057) (0.043) (0.030) (0.025) (0.039) (0.023) (0.022) (0.014)
4950 4581 5150 14681 4950 4217 5150 14317
Global History ‐0.085 ‐0.025 ‐0.008 ‐0.036 ‐0.072** ‐0.017 0.009 ‐0.025
(0.053) (0.042) (0.038) (0.025) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.015)
6277 5925 6863 19065 4757 4699 5222 14678
US History ‐0.070* ‐0.012 0.038 ‐0.011 ‐0.053** ‐0.017 0.038 ‐0.007
(0.038) (0.032) (0.036) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.016)
4440 4281 4987 13708 2808 4148 3797 10753
Living Environment ‐0.06 0.092** ‐0.072** ‐0.015 ‐0.080*** 0.057** ‐0.031 ‐0.025**
(0.041) (0.039) (0.033) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.012)















Brooklyn Tech 0.401*** 0.967*** 0.559*** 0.406*** 0.901*** 0.523***
(0.075) (0.156) (0.064) (0.090) (0.221) (0.057)
Bronx Science 0.325*** 0.629*** 0.177*** 0.304*** 0.785*** 0.155**
(0.114) (0.217) (0.068) (0.114) (0.296) (0.073)
Stuyvesant 0.087 0.104 0.272*** 0.067 0.118 0.258***













17727 14317(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Enrollment ‐0.059 0.059 ‐0.022 0.038
(0.053) (0.044) (0.051) (0.042)
Exam Years ‐0.025 0.027 ‐0.008 0.016
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021)
Peer Mean ‐0.070* 0.025 ‐0.030 0.027
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034)
O'Bryant 0.730*** 1.530*** 0.753*** 0.737*** 1.403*** 0.687***
(0.064) (0.125) (0.073) (0.068) (0.127) (0.070)
Latin Academy 0.118** 0.219* 0.388*** 0.142** 0.227 0.378***
(0.057) (0.128) (0.085) (0.062) (0.143) (0.079)
Latin School 0.032 0.072 0.628*** 0.022 0.045 0.534***
(0.022) (0.053) (0.093) (0.022) (0.058) (0.080)
Brooklyn Tech 0.401*** 0.967*** 0.559*** 0.406*** 0.901*** 0.523***
(0.075) (0.156) (0.064) (0.090) (0.221) (0.057)
Bronx Science 0.325*** 0.629*** 0.177*** 0.304*** 0.785*** 0.155**
(0.114) (0.217) (0.068) (0.114) (0.296) (0.073)
Stuyvesant 0.087 0.104 0.272*** 0.067 0.118 0.258***
(0.074) (0.131) (0.076) (0.081) (0.197) (0.095)
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Figure 6. Average Baseline English Scores of Peers for 7th Grade Applicants (1997-2008) in Boston 
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Figure 25. English Regents Scores for 9th Grade Applicants (2004-2007) in NYCReferences
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